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The Bitcoin mining game
v.0.1
Nicolas Houy∗
March 11, 2014
Abstract
When processing transactions in a block, a miner increases his reward but also
decreases his probability to earn any reward because the time needed for his block
to reach consensus depends on its size. We show that this leads to a game situation
between miners. We analytically solve this game for two miners. Then, we show that
miners do not play a Nash equilibrium in the current Bitcoin mining environment,
instead, they should not process any transaction. Finally, we show that the situation
where no transaction is ever processed would stop being a Nash equilibrium if the
transaction fee was multiplied or, equivalently, the ﬁxed reward divided by a factor
of about 12.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D62.
Keywords: Bitcoin, mining, crypto-currency, game.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin1 has been invented in 2008 ([Nakamoto, 2008]) but it really became popular and
left the circle of strict early adopters in 2013. At the time this article is written, bitcoins can
be bought and sold at about $620 apiece on some exchange markets. The monetary base is
about $7,700,000,000. Bitcoin is usually described by laymen as an electronic or internet
money even though this deﬁnition is much criticized by the computer science community
that rather talks about a disruptive and revolutionary protocol. As a protocol, Bitcoin
is still in its early stages of development and its speciﬁcations are still often modiﬁed. In
order to reach the stage of implementation, a proposed modiﬁcation goes through a whole
process of validation. Some questions regarding some speciﬁcations of the Bitcoin protocol
are still more or less open, transitory or left undecided. Among those questions is the value
and structure of the rewards earned by the miners. In this paper, we analyze this aspect
∗Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130,
France. E-mail: houy@gate.cnrs.fr.
1As the norm tends to be, we will write "Bitcoin" for the network or the protocol and "bitcoin" (or
BTC) for each of the tokens that circulate on it.
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of the Bitcoin protocol. Notice that the study we lead in this article are inspired by the
qualitative intuitions given in [Andresen, 2013].
In order to do that, we need to describe, even superﬁcially, how Bitcoin actually works.
When an individual sends some bitcoins to another individual, this information is broadcast
to the peer-to-peer Bitcoin network. However, for technical purposes we won't address here,
this transaction needs to be included, together with other transactions forming a block, in
the blockchain in order to be conﬁrmed and secured. The blockchain is a public ledger that
contains the full history of all the transactions in bitcoin ever processed. It is the role of
miners to do this work of conﬁrming and securing2 transactions. Practically, this mining
process consists in solving a mathematical problem and spreading the result to the Bitcoin
network for it to reach consensus.3 The ﬁrst miner to do so sees his block included in the
blockchain. As it requires computational resources, the successful miner is rewarded in
bitcoins for his useful work. In the current implementation of Bitcoin, this reward comes
from both an ex-nihilo creation of some new bitcoins and some fees Bitcoin users can add
to their transactions. In order to control the monetary base, mining is made more complex
than it could be. And since, in the ﬁrst approximation, the probability for each miner to
solve a mining problem depends on his computational power, the complexity of mining is
made dependent on the total computational power of all miners. Precisely, the complexity
is dynamically adjusted so that a block solving and hence a creation of bitcoins occurs
every ten minutes in expectation.
In this article, we tackle the question of the incentives the miners face as a function
of the reward structure and values. First, let us see the possible gains. As it is today,
the ﬁxed reward is 25 BTC per block. The ﬁxed reward was 50 BTC in the ﬁrst days of
Bitcoin and this amount is halved every 210,000 blocks. Hence, the number of bitcoins
issued is programmed to asymptotically reach a maximum of 21,000,000. At the time this
article is written, there are about 12,500,000 bitcoins in circulation. The variable reward is
0.0001 BTC per transaction.4 Second let us see the cost structure. When mining a block,
a miner is free to choose which of the transactions in the network he wishes to include
in his block. In a very good ﬁrst approximation, computing the mining mathematical
problem with more transactions included in it is not more expensive in terms of CPU,
disk or bandwidth. However, it should be considered that the larger a block, the longer
it takes for it to be spread in the Bitcoin network and reach consensus. Then, including
transactions in a block can have the adverse eﬀect of lowering the probability of a miner to
earn any reward. When a block is mined but is outraced by another, it becomes orphaned.
2This security aspect of the mining activity is often forgotten or not know by the Bitcoin critics, see
[Krugman, 2013] for instance. Even though their name can lead to confusion, Bitcoin miners have very
little in common with gold miners and their role is very diﬀerent in the Bitcoin protocol.
3We will say with no diﬀerence "solving" a mathematical problem" and "solving" or "ﬁnding a block".
4In reality, transactions can have diﬀerent sizes in bytes and require diﬀerent levels of fees to be com-
puted. The size of a transaction depends on many parameters (number of inputs and outputs mainly) but
not directly on the amount paid in the transaction. Throughout this article, we will make the simplifying
assumption that all transactions have same size. At the time this article is written, the transaction fees
represent about 0.4% of the miners' rewards. The remaining 99.6% are newly created bitcoins.
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As we will show, this trade-oﬀ depends on how many transactions other miners include
in their blocks themselves. Then, the number of transactions included in blocks is the
outcome of a game: the Bitcoin mining game that we propose to study in this article.
In Section 2, we describe the Bitcoin mining game. In Section 3, we analytically study
the equilibria of this game in the case with two miners. In Section 4, we study the current
situation of the Bitcoin mining environment. We show that Bitcoin miners are not at a
Nash equilibrium and a unilateral deviation could increase its author's beneﬁt up to 2%.
We also show that with the current incentives, miners should simply all play the strategy
of including no transaction in their blocks. Finally, we will show that, if the miners'
relative computational power distribution remains the same, the equilibrium where no
miner includes a transaction in a block will stop being one in about 15 years or today if
the transaction fee is increased by a factor 12.
2 Model
Let us consider a set N = {1, ..., N} of miners on the Bitcoin network with N ≥ 2.5
Each miner i ∈ N has a relative hash power αi > 0 such that
∑
j∈N
αj = 1. Miners
struggle against each other in a race to ﬁnd the solution of a mathematical problem. This
mathematical problem is solved by a try and guess strategy such that the occurrence of
solving the problem can be modeled as a random variable following a Poisson process.
The complexity of ﬁnding a block is dynamically adjusted so that this operation takes 600
seconds in expectation. Then, the mining Poisson process of the mining process has a
parameter λ = 1/600 > 0 for the whole network.
The number of transactions included in a block to be solved is chosen by each miner.
This number has no eﬀect on the complexity of the mathematical problem or on the cost
to solve it. However, once a miner has found a block with a given number of transactions
in it, he needs to broadcast his solution to the Bitcoin network and his solution must
reach consensus. Now, the time needed for a block to reach consensus is depending on the
number of transactions included in this block. Let k(x) be the time needed for a block
including x transactions to reach consensus. We will make the assumption that this time
function is linear, k(x) = k.x with k > 0. The ﬁrst miner to have found a block that
reaches consensus earns (in bitcoins) a ﬁxed reward R ≥ 0 and a variable one c.x with
c ≥ 0.
We assume that all miners start trying to ﬁnd a new block at the same time. Each
miner i ∈ N includes xi > 0 transactions in the block he tries to ﬁnd. Let −→x = (x1, ..., xn)
be the sequence of the numbers of transactions included in the new block to be found, one
for each miner. Obviously, the probability for i to ﬁnd a block between t and t + dt and
5With a slight of rigor but with no risk of confusion, N denotes both the set of miners and the cardinality
of this set.
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that this block will be the ﬁrst to reach consensus is ∏
j∈N,t+k(xi)−k(xj)≥0
exp(−λαj(t+ k(xi)− k(xj)))
λαidt. (1)
After simple calculation, for any miner i ∈ N , the probability Pi(−→x ) to ﬁnd a block and
that this block will be the ﬁrst to reach consensus is
Pi(
−→x ) = αiλ
∫ ∞
t=0
exp
(−λ ((1−Qi(−→x , t))(t+ k(xi)) + Ai(−→x , t)− k)) dt, (2)
where
k =
∑
j∈N
αjk(xj),
and ∀i ∈ N, ∀t > 0,6
Qi(
−→x , t) =
∑
j∈N
αj1(k(xj)>t+k(xi)),
Ai(
−→x , t) =
∑
j∈N
αjk(xj)1(k(xj)>t+k(xi)).
The expected reward Πi(
−→x ) is equal to the probability to ﬁnd the ﬁrst block to reach
consensus times the reward if this is the case.
Πi(
−→x ) = (R + c.xi)Pi(−→x ). (3)
The following is straightforward from Equations 1 and 3.
Proposition 1
Let i ∈ N .
1. ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, ∂Πi(
−→x )
∂xj
≥ 0,
2. ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, ∂Πi(
−→x )
∂xj
> 0 whenever (R + c.xi) > 0,
3.
∂Πi(
−→x )
∂xi
< 0 whenever c = 0 and R > 0,
4.
∂Πi(
−→x )
∂xi
= 0 whenever c = 0 and R = 0.
6For any proposition p, the indicator function 1p is equal to 1 if p is true, 0 otherwise.
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Proposition 1 shows that introducing transactions in blocks by a miner has positive
externalities on other miners (and hence that our game theoretical approach is justiﬁed).
Indeed, when a miner i ∈ N introduces more transactions in his block, he makes longer the
time needed to spread his block, in turn allowing more time for other miners to ﬁnd the
next block, spread it to the network and reach consensus with it. However, this does not
imply that the expected reward decreases for i. Indeed, it is true that introducing more
transactions in the block he is looking for decreases i's probability to ﬁnd and spread it
ﬁrst. But it also increases the reward he earns in case he is actually the ﬁrst one to ﬁnd
and spread the next block. Of course, for this reasoning to be valid, we need to have c > 0
or else the marginal beneﬁt to include transactions in blocks vanishes. In the trivial case
where c = 0 and R = 0, the beneﬁts of mining is obviously 0 anyway: there is nothing to
earn whatever the sequence −→x .
Generally, in order to decide the optimal number of transactions to include in a block,
each miner i ∈ N solves the following maximization program.
max
xi∈R+
Πi(
−→x ). (4)
We will need the following Lemma in the remainder. Assume that all miners include
the same number of transactions in their blocks, formally, ∀i ∈ N, xi = x. Then, for
each miner i ∈ N , the probability to earn the reward associated with a block solving is
just the probability to solve the mining mathematical problem ﬁrst and hence is directly
proportional to the hash rate αi. Formally, in this case, ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ≥ 0, Ai(−→x , t) =
Qi(
−→x , t) = 0 and Lemma 1 is proved with simple calculation.
Lemma 1
If ∀i ∈ N, xi = x, then Pi(−→x ) = αi and Πi(−→x ) = (R + cx)αi.
For the sake of simplicity, we will now concentrate on the case with N = 2 even though
most of our results can be generalized to the N > 2 case with no logical diﬃculty but at
the price of cumbersome calculation.
3 The two miners case
Let N = {1, 2}. For any miner i ∈ N , if xi ≥ x3−i,7 then ∀t > 0, Qi((x1, x2), t) = 0
and Ai((x1, x2), t) = 0. Then, the expected reward earned by miner i is
Πi(x1, x2) = Π
+(xi, x3−i) = (R + c.xi)αi exp (−(1− αi)λ(k(xi)− k(x3−i))) .
Following, assume xi < x−i, the expected reward earned by miner i is
Πi(x1, x2) = Π
−(xi, x3−i) = (R + c.xi) (1− (1− αi) exp (−αiλ(k(x3−i)− k(xi)))) .
7Obviously, if i = 1, 3− i = 2 and if i = 2, 3− i = 1.
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Let NE ⊆ 2(R+)2 be the set of Nash equilibria of the mining game. Formally, ∀(x∗1, x∗2) ∈
(R+)2, (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ NE if and only if x∗1 ∈ arg max
x1∈R+
Π1(x1, x
∗
2) and x
∗
2 ∈ arg max
x2∈R+
Π2(x
∗
1, x2).
Our ﬁrst result is rather trivial and follows directly from Proposition 1(3). When c = 0
and R > 0,8 including a transaction in a block has the only consequence to make longer
the period needed for a miner's block to reach consensus. The marginal reward associated
with this inclusion is null. Hence, there are only negative incentives for miners to include
transactions in blocks.
Proposition 2
Let c = 0 and R > 0. The Bitcoin mining game has a unique Nash equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈
(R+)2 with x∗1 = x∗2 = 0. Moreover, Π1(x∗1, x∗2) = α1R and Π1(x∗1, x∗2) = α2R.
For non trivial cases with c > 0, let us ﬁrst concentrate on the symmetric games, i.e.
on the cases with equal hash power, α1 = α2 = 1/2. For each of these games, there exists
a unique Nash Equilibrium and it is symmetric.
Proposition 3
Let c > 0. Assume α1 = α2 = 1/2. The Bitcoin mining game has a unique Nash equilibrium
(x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈ (R+)2 with x∗1 = x∗2 = max
{
0,
2
λk
− R
c
}
. Moreover, Π1(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = Π2(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) =
max
{
R/2,
c
λk
}
.
Then, in the symmetric case, Nash equilibria are symmetric. This is in line with the
idea that when including transactions in blocks, a miner has a positive externality on other
miners. Indeed, if there was a diﬀerence between two identical miners, say x1 < x2, 1 would
marginally beneﬁt more from 2's action than 2 would beneﬁt from 1's action. Hence there
exist a force for 1 to increase the number of transactions to include in his block and a force
for 2 to decrease the number of transactions to include in his block. Then, a trend toward
equalization of actions. Notice also that the fact that including transactions in blocks
has positive externalities implies a globally low level of transactions included in blocks.
Indeed, if the two miners were cooperating and maximizing the sum of the proﬁts, they
would choose x1 and x2 as large as possible.
Now, let us study the asymmetric case. With no loss of generality, let us assume
α1 > α2.
Proposition 4
Let c > 0. Assume with no loss of generality, α1 > α2. The Bitcoin mining game has a
unique Nash equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈ (R+)2 with
• if 1
λk(1− α1) −
R
c
≤ 0, x∗1 = x∗2 = 0.
8Obviously, when both c = 0 and R = 0, the result is even more trivial since all miners' payoﬀ are 0
whatever their and others miners' actions (Proposition 1(4)).
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• if 1
λk(1− α1) −
R
c
> 0, x∗1 =
1
λk(1− α1) −
R
c
> x∗2 ≥ 0.
In the asymmetric case, there is still a large set of parameters for which not including
any transaction in a block for both miners is the only Nash equilibrium of the Bitcoin
mining game. We can also notice that the number of transactions included by the miner
with the greatest hash power is larger than the number of transactions included by the
miner with the lowest hash power.
Obviously, as one of the main interests of Bitcoin is to serve as a payment system, it is
of great importance to check for the plausibility of the set of parameters for which miners
do not include transactions for processing in their blocks. If it were the case, Bitcoin could
deﬁnitely not be used as a payment system. This is the motivation to study the mining
environment as it is today.
4 The current case
In this Section, we study the current behavior of the actual miners in the Bitcoin
network. Concretely, miners are rather mining pools but we will make no diﬀerence as
we consider that the best strategy for a mining pool is the same whether it is a pool or a
single miner, beneﬁts being redistributed among the participants of the pool. All the data
we need for this study is made public in the Bitcoin blockchain and protocol9 or relies on
the assumption based on personal expertise and experience that, today, all miners include
all the transactions in the network when trying to ﬁnd a block. Unless otherwise stated,
the values for our computations are displayed in Table 1. We will also consider that the
Bitcoin network hash power is distributed as shown in Table 2 (row B). We inferred these
relative hash powers of miners from an analysis of the blocks found. Indeed, if we make, as
already noted, the assumption that all miners include all the transactions in the network
in their blocks, then, by Lemma 1, the probability to solve a block for any miner is exactly
equal to his relative hash power. Further, we make the assumption that the frequency of
blocks found by a miner10, that we can observe, is the probability that he solves a block
and, hence, his relative hash power.
Let us start our analysis of the current situation displayed in Table 2. We make the
assumption that there are 320 transactions in the network. This is the average number of
transactions in the blocks inserted in the blockchain in the year preceding our study (and
this number is rather stable). As we said above, it is today's practice that when mining
a block, all miners introduce all 320 transactions in the block they are mining. Formally,
∀i ∈ N, xi = 320. In this case, by Lemma 1, the probability to ﬁnd a block ﬁrst (and
equivalently to be the ﬁrst to see his block reach consensus), is equal to its share of the
total hash power (row B). We can now consider each miner and compute his best response
9The data we use from the blockchain are based on last-year averages as recorded on March 5th, 2013.
Data from the protocol can be found in the Bitcoin open-source code.
10The data we use from the blockchain for the block solving frequency are based on 3 last days averages
as recorded on March 5th, 2013.
7
Nicolas Houy v.0.1
Data Value Dimension Description and Source
λ 1/600 second-1 Bitcoin protocol parameter.
s 0.5 kB Average transaction size,
statistics from the blockchain.
kb 0.08 second.kB
-1 Marginal time needed to reach consensus
per kB, [Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013].
k 0.04 second.tx-1 Marginal time needed to reach
consensus per transaction (tx), kb.s.
c 10−4 BTC Bitcoin protocol current
implementation parameter.
R 25 BTC Bitcoin protocol current
implementation parameter.
Table 1: Data values.
to the other miners' current strategy. This optimal number of transactions to include in the
current computed block is 0 for all miners (row D). This shows that the current situation
is not a Nash Equilibrium. Stronger, all miners have a proﬁtable deviation. If unilaterally
mining blocks with no transaction, a miner would increase his probability to earn the ﬁxed
25 BTC reward (row E) at the cost of the 320×0.0001 = 0.32 BTC variable reward in case
of successful mining. In the current case, this deviation would lead to a higher expected
beneﬁt (rows F,G).
We can also check that all miners including no transaction in the block they are mining
(∀i ∈ N, xi = 0) is a Nash Equilibrium with the current parameters given in Table 1. The
expected reward for miner i, in this case where ∀j ∈ N, xj = 0 is αi.R by Lemma 1. The
actual values are given in Table 3.
Now, we study the conditions under which the situation where all miners include no
transaction in their blocks is a Nash equilibrium. Said diﬀerently, when no miner should
include any transaction in their blocks, Bitcoin fails at being an eﬃcient payment system.
Hence, we look at the set of parameters for which a minimum requirement for Bitcoin to
be a usable payment system is met. From Equation 3, it is straightforward to see that
Πi(
−→x ) = (R+ cxi)αi exp (−λ(1− αi)k(xi)) whenever −→x is such that ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = 0.
Then, since c > 0, the best response number of transactions to include in a block by
i ∈ N is11 arg max
xi>0
Πi(
−→x ) = {max{0, 1
λ(1− αi)k −
R
c
}}. Then, the situation where all
miners include no transaction in their blocks stops being a Nash equilibrium when ∃i ∈
N,
c
λ(1− αi)k > R. The highest value of R for which this occurs is R ≈ 2.03 BTC below
which GHash.IO will have an incentive to include some transactions in the block it tries to
mine. Since R halves about every 4 years, this situation will occur in about 15 years with
11The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5 given in Appendix and is therefore omitted.
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A B C D E F G
GHash.IO 26.012% 6.51121 0 26.421% 6.60525 1.444%
BTCGuild 22.736% 5.69128 0 23.110% 5.77747 1.514%
Eligius 19.075% 4.77489 0 19.404% 4.85095 1.593%
DiscusFish 11.946% 2.99034 0 12.170% 3.04254 1.746%
Deepbit 9.056% 2.26687 0 9.231% 2.30785 1.808%
BitMinter 3.276% 0.81993 0 3.343% 0.83577 1.932%
Slush 3.083% 0.77170 0 3.147% 0.78664 1.936%
Bitparking 0.963% 0.24116 0 0.984% 0.24594 1.982%
BTCMine 0.963% 0.24116 0 0.984% 0.24594 1.982%
50BTC 0.963% 0.24116 0 0.984% 0.24594 1.982%
OzCoin 0.771% 0.19292 0 0.787% 0.19676 1.986%
Polmine 0.385% 0.09646 0 0.394% 0.09839 1.994%
P2Pool 0.385% 0.09646 0 0.394% 0.09839 1.994%
EclipseMC 0.193% 0.04823 0 0.197% 0.04920 1.999%
ASICMiner 0.193% 0.04823 0 0.197% 0.04920 1.999%
Table 2: A: miner's name, B: relative hash power, C: expected reward when ∀i ∈ N, xi =
320, D: optimal number of transaction included by miner i in the current block when
∀j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = 320, E: probability to be the ﬁrst miner to ﬁnd a block reaching
consensus when ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = 320 and xi given in D, F: expected reward when
∀j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = 320 and xi given in D, G: (F-C) in %.
R = 1.5625.12 In this case, the best response of GHash.IO will be to include 4,648 (or any
smaller upper limit if it exists) transactions in a block. The other miners' best responses
for R = 1.5625 are given in Table 4.
Equivalently, the lowest value of c for which the situation where all miners include no
transaction in their blocks is not a Nash equilibrium is c ≈ 0.00123 BTC. Above this value,
GHash.IO will have an incentive to include some transactions in the block it tries to mine.
This corresponds to an increase from the current value of the transaction fee of a factor
approx. 12.3. At the time this article is written, 0.00123 BTC can be bought for about
$0.76.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have introduced and studied the Bitcoin mining game. When miners
make a decision regarding how many transactions they should include in the block they are
12Obviously, this 15 years projection should be seen as an illustration rather than a prediction. Indeed, it
would certainly be unsound to state that in 15 years the mining environment will be unchanged, especially
regarding the hash rate distribution among miners and k that highly depends on bandwidth (see the
Nielsen's Law of Internet Bandwidth).
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Mining Expected
pool reward
GHash.IO 6.50289
BTCGuild 5.68401
Eligius 4.76879
DiscusFish 2.98651
Deepbit 2.26397
BitMinter 0.81888
Slush 0.77071
Bitparking 0.24085
BTCMine 0.24085
50BTC 0.24085
OzCoin 0.19268
Polmine 0.09634
P2Pool 0.09634
EclipseMC 0.04817
ASICMiner 0.04817
Table 3: Expected reward of miners in BTC when ∀i ∈ N, xi = 0.
mining, they must study the trade-oﬀ between, on the one side, including more transactions
and hence earn more transaction fees if they ﬁnd the current block ﬁrst and, on the other
side, including less transactions in order to minimize the time they need to spread their
block solution and reach consensus with it, hence maximizing their probability to include
their block in the blockchain ﬁrst. We have studied the two miners case analytically. We
have also showed that in the current Bitcoin mining environment, miners are not at a
Nash equilibrium of the Bitcoin mining game. Instead, they should all stop including any
transaction in their blocks. Finally, we showed that this situation where all miners do
not include any transaction in their blocks would stop being a Nash Equilibrium if the
transaction fee was multiplied or, equivalently, the ﬁxed reward divided by a factor of
about 12.
We can see two limitations to our study. The ﬁrst one is about the security of the Bitcoin
system. As we said, for Bitcoin to be used as an eﬃcient payment system, it is a minimal
requirement that transactions be processed. However, this is not suﬃcient. Indeed, Bitcoin
is vulnerable to what is called 51% attacks (see [Eyal and Sirer, 2013, Kroll et al., 2013,
Houy, 2014]). Such an attack can occur when a miner can solve too many blocks in a row
in expectation. It is usually said that this is the case when a miner owns strictly more than
50% of the hash power.13 In order to make such an attack costly, the total hash rate of
the Bitcoin network should be as large as possible. Since we did not consider the hash rate
13Actually, as we showed, at the outcome of the Bitcoin mining game, the probability to solve a block
is not necessarily equal to the relative hash power.
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A B C D E F G
GHash.IO 26.012% 0.40643 4648 20.682% 0.41929 3.164%
BTCGuild 22.736% 0.35525 3789 18.705% 0.36314 2.220%
Eligius 19.075% 0.29805 2911 16.303% 0.30219 1.389%
DiscusFish 11.946% 0.18666 1410 10.997% 0.18734 0.363%
Deepbit 9.056% 0.14150 869 8.591% 0.14170 0.144%
BitMinter 3.276% 0.05118 0 3.276% 0.05118 0.000%
Slush 3.083% 0.04817 0 3.083% 0.04817 0.000%
Bitparking 0.963% 0.01505 0 0.963% 0.01505 0.000%
BTCMine 0.963% 0.01505 0 0.963% 0.01505 0.000%
50BTC 0.963% 0.01505 0 0.963% 0.01505 0.000%
OzCoin 0.771% 0.01204 0 0.771% 0.01204 0.000%
Polmine 0.385% 0.00602 0 0.385% 0.00602 0.000%
P2Pool 0.385% 0.00602 0 0.385% 0.00602 0.000%
EclipseMC 0.193% 0.00301 0 0.193% 0.00301 0.000%
ASICMiner 0.193% 0.00301 0 0.193% 0.00301 0.000%
Table 4: With R = 1.5625 BTC, A: miner's name, B: relative hash power, C: expected
reward when ∀i ∈ N, xi = 0, D: optimal number of transaction included by miner i in the
current block when ∀j ∈ N \{i}, xj = 0, E: probability to be the ﬁrst miner to ﬁnd a block
reaching consensus when ∀j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = 0 and xi given in D, F: expected reward when
∀j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = 0 and xi given in D, G: (F-C) in %.
as an endogenous variable, what matters in our study when an agent makes his decision
regarding the number of transactions to be included in his block is the ratio between the
ﬁxed and the variable rewards (R/c). However, the miners' beneﬁts that will drive the
hash rate purchase and hence eventually decide on the security of Bitcoin will depend on
R and c in absolute values. This aspect has already been studied, though in a diﬀerent
context in [Houy, 2014b].
The second limitation is about the value of the Bitcoin network. Miners are rewarded
in bitcoins. Hence, they have a vested interest in it to function well. And miners know
that not processing transactions in their blocks means that Bitcoin loses some of its value
as a mean of exchange. Hence, any reward they may earn from their mining activity
has no value in this case. This suggests that the Bitcoin mining game should include a
supplementary public good game.
Today, there is a debate in the Bitcoin developers community about the variable cost
c. Should it be encoded and imposed in the protocol as it is partially today or should it
be left to the market to decide its value? In the market case, if Bitcoin users want their
transactions to be processed, then, they should attach to them a high enough fee. We
believe that this paper gives a ﬁrst result in the study of such a market: if a market was to
be organized, with today's parameter, the transaction processing oﬀer would be non null
for transactions fees at least 0.0012BTC. We are rather uncertain about the relevance of
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such a market because of the large externalities induced by the mining activity, some that
we showed in this article, some that we showed in [Houy, 2014b].
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Most of our analytical results are proved using the following lemmas.
Lemma 2 states that ∀i ∈ N = {1, 2},Πi(x1, x2) is continuous and has a continuous
derivative with respect to xi at xi = x3−i > 0.
Lemma 2
Π+(xi, x3−i) = Π−(xi, x3−i) at xi = x3−i.
Proof. With simple calculation, it is straightforward to show that Π+(xi, x3−i) = (R +
cxi)αi = Π
−(xi, x3−i) in xi = x3−i. 
Lemma 3
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
=
∂Π−(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
at xi = x3−i.
Proof. It is easy to get
∂ ln(Π+(xi, x3−i))
∂xi
=
c
R + cxi
− α3−iλk,
and
∂ ln(Π−(xi, x3−i))
∂xi
=
c
R + cxi
− α3−iαikλ exp (−αiλ(k(x3−i)− k(xi)))
(1− α3−i exp (−αiλ(k(x3−i)− k(xi)))) ,
and it is straightforward to check that both are equal when x−i = xi. 
Lemma 4
∂2Π−(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
≥ 0. Moreover, if R > 0 or c > 0, ∂
2Π−(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
< 0.
Proof. Let P (xi, x−i) = α3−i exp (−αiλ(k(x3−i)− k(xi))).
Π−(xi, x3−i) = (R + cxi)(1− P (xi, x3−i)).
∂Π−(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
= c(1− P (xi, x3−i))− (R + cxi)αikλP (xi, x3−i)
∂2Π−(xi, x3−i)
∂x2i
= −cαiλkP (xi, x3−i)− cαiλkP (xi, x3−i)− (R+ cxi)(αiλk)2P (xi, x3−i) ≤ 0.
Moreover,
∂2Π−(xi, x3−i)
∂x2i
< 0 if R > 0 or c > 0. 
Lemma 5
Assume c > 0.
∂2Π+(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
< 0 whenever xi <
2
α3−iλk
− R
c
. When xi ≥ 2
α3−iλk
− R
c
,
∂Π+(xi, x−i)
∂xi
< 0.
Assume c = 0 and R > 0.
∂Π+(xi, x−i)
∂xi
< 0.
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Proof. Let P (xi, x3−i) = αi exp (−α3−iλ(k(xi)− k(x3−i))).
Π+(xi, x3−i) = (R + cxi)P (xi, x3−i).
I. Assume c > 0.
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
= cP (xi, x3−i)− (R + cxi)α3−iλkP (xi, x3−i),
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
= cP (xi, x3−i)− (R + cxi)α3−iλkP (xi, x3−i),
∂2Π+(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
= α−iλkP (xi, x−i)((R + cxi)α−iλk − 2c).
Then, obviously,
∂2Π+(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
< 0 whenever xi <
2
α3−iλk
− R
c
. Then, obviously,
∂2Π+(xi, x−i)
∂x2i
≥ 0 whenever xi ≥ 2
α3−iλk
− R
c
.
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
= −cP (xi, x3−i) < 0
at xi =
2
α3−iλk
−R
c
. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
is negative
when xi is arbitrarily large. Then, necessarily,
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
< 0 whenever xi ≥ 2
α3−iλk
−
R
c
.
II. Assume c = 0.
∂Π+(xi, x3−i)
∂xi
= −Rα3−iλkP (xi, x3−i) < 0.

A Proof of Proposition 2
It is straightforward to check that
∂Π+(xi, x
∗
3−i)
∂xi
< 0 and
∂Π−(xi, x∗3−i)
∂x1
< 0 for on R+.
Hence, by Lemma 2, NE = {(0, 0)}.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Assume NE 6= ∅. With no loss of generality, let us assume x∗1 ≥ x∗2. Then, Π1(x∗1, x∗2) =
Π+(x∗1, x
∗
2) = (R+c.x
∗
1)α1 exp (−α2λ(k(x∗1)− k(x∗2))).
∂Π1(x1, x
∗
2)
∂x1
= α1 exp (−α2λ(k(x1)− k(x∗2))) (c−
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α2λk(R+ c.x1)) in x1 = x
∗
1 which has the sign of (c−α2λk(R+ c.x∗1)). Then, by continuity
of Π+ and Lemmas 2, 3 and 5, we necessarily have x∗1 = max{0,
2
λk
− R
c
} or x∗1 < x∗2 which
contradicts the assumption that x∗1 ≥ x∗2.
Assume 0 >
2
λk
−R
c
, then x∗1 = 0. By assumption, x
∗
2 = 0. Then, Π1(x
∗
1, 0) = Π
+
1 (x
∗
1, 0)
and it is straightforward to check that
∂Π+(x1, 0)
∂x1
< 0 at x∗1. By Lemma 5, x
∗
1 = 0 is the
only maximum of Π+(x1, 0). Then, NE = {(0, 0)}.
Assume 0 ≤ 2
λk
− R
c
. x∗1 =
2
λk
− R
c
. Now, it is straightforward to check that
∂Π2(x
∗
1, x2)
∂x2
=
∂Π−(x2, x∗1)
∂x2
= 0 in x2 = x
∗
1. By Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, arg max
x2∈R+
Π2(x
∗
1, x2) =
2
λk
− R
c
and then, NE = {( 2
λk
− R
c
,
2
λk
− R
c
)}.
Similarly to what has been shown above, it is straightforward to check that (
2
λk
−
R
c
,
2
λk
− R
c
) ∈ NE and then NE 6= ∅.
C Proof of Proposition 4
computing the mining mathematical problem with more transactions included in it is
not more expensive in terms of CPU, disk or bandwidth. However, it should be considered
that the larger a block, the longer it takes for it to be spread in the Bitcoin network and
reach consensus. Then, including transactions in a block can have the adverse eﬀect of
lowering the probability of a miner to earn any reward. As we will show, this trade-oﬀ
depends on how many transactions other miners include in their blocks themselves. Then,
the number of transactions included in blocks is the outcome of a game: the Bitcoin mining
game that we propose to study in this article.
Let α1 > α2 and assume that NE 6= ∅.
I. Assume x∗1 ≥ x∗2. Then, Π1(x∗1, x∗2) = Π+(x∗1, x∗2) = (R+c.x∗1)α1 exp (−α2λ(k(x∗1)− k(x∗2))).
∂Π1(x1, x
∗
2)
∂x1
= α1 exp (−α2λ(k(x1)− k(x∗2))) (c−α2λk(R+c.x1)) which has the sign of (c−
α2λk(R+c.x1)). Then, by Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, we necessarily have x
∗
1 = max{0,
1
λkα2
−R
c
}
or x∗1 < x
∗
2 which contradicts the assumption that x
∗
1 ≥ x∗2.
a) Assume
1
λkα2
− R
c
≥ 0. Let us compute ∂Π2(x
∗
1, x2)
∂x2
in x2 = x
∗
1. After simple
computation, it has the sign of c(1− α1
α2
) and then is, since α1 > α2, strictly negative. By
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, this implies that the best response of miner 2 is unique and strictly
below x∗1 if x
∗
1 > 0 or equal to x
∗
1 if x1 = 0.
b) Assume
1
λkα2
− R
c
< 0 and hence x∗1 = 0.
∂Π2(x
∗
1, x2)
∂x2
in x2 = x
∗
1 has the sign of
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c− α1λkR. 1
λkα2
− R
c
< 0 and α1 > α2 imply c− α1λkR < 0.Then, x∗1 = 0 and x∗2 = 0 is
the only Nash Equilibrium by Lemmas 2, 3 and 4.
II. Assume x∗2 > x
∗
1. Then, Π2(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = Π
+(x∗2, x
∗
1) = (R+c.x
∗
2)α2 exp (−α1λ(k(x∗2)− k(x∗1))).
∂Π2(x
∗
1, x2)
∂x2
= α2 exp (−α1λ(k(x2)− k(x∗1))) (c−α1λk(R+c.x2)) which has the sign of (c−
α1λk(R+c.x
∗
2)). Then, by Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, we necessarily have x
∗
2 = max{0,
1
λkα1
−R
c
}
or x∗2 < x
∗
1 which contradicts the assumption that x
∗
2 > x
∗
1. Assume x
∗
2 = 0, this contradicts
the assumption that x∗2 > x
∗
1. Assume x
∗
2 =
1
λkα1
− R
c
> 0. Let us compute
∂Π1(x1, x
∗
2)
∂x1
in
x1 = x
∗
2. After simple computation, it has the sign of c(1−
α2
α1
) and then is, since α1 > α2,
strictly positive. By Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, this contradicts the fact that x∗2 > x
∗
1.
Similarly to what has been shown above, it is straightforward to check that NE 6= ∅.
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